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Cities are constantly changing, either in a slow, gradualist manner, or through catastrophe such as war. This
paper examines the mechanisms for reconstructing British towns after the bombing of the Second World War.
The emerging national planning system, and examples of individual local responses, are discussed. This example
of post-catastrophe reconstruction planning proved to be a slow and difficult process, with many disagreements
between the national and local planners. It does not easily conform to standard models of post-disaster planning.
El URBANISMO DE LA RECONSTRUCCIÓN DESPUÉS DEL DESASTRE DE LA GUERRA. 
Lecciones de Inglaterra en la década de 1940 
Las ciudades cambian constantemente, bien de forma lenta y gradual, o con catástrofes como ocurre con las
guerras. El artículo analiza los mecanismos para la reconstrucción de las ciudades británicas después de los
bombardeos de la segunda Guerra Mundial. Se discute el sistema nacional de planeamiento que entonces emerge,
así como ejemplos de respuestas locales. Este ejemplo de urbanismo de reconstrucción post-catástrofe se mostró
como un proceso lento y dificultoso, con varios desacuerdos entre los urbanistas nacionales y locales. No se
corresponde fácilmente con los modelos estándar del urbanismo aplicado después de los desastres.
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Introduction
CITIES ARE NOT STATIC. CHANGE, OF ONE FORM OR
another, is inevitable. Numerous studies of the
nature, extent and mechanisms of urban change (eg
Whitehand, 1987, 1992) have shown how these
processes fluctuate over time and space. There can be
periods of intensive change, involving outward
growth and internal intensification; but there can also
be periods of quiescence. Causes are usually linked to
large-scale (national and even international)
economic fluctuations. Disaster, whether natural or
human-induced, interrupts this ‘natural’ process of
urban change.
The nature of catastrophe is very variable, as is
the nature of the planning response. Much has been
written on responses to natural disaster, from volca-
noes to earthquakes (Tobriner, 1992; Nakabayashi,
1986). Fire, too, is commonly studied (Reddaway,
1940; Bowden, 1970). This broad body of research
has suggested a simple sequential model for disaster
recovery, which can be divided into four phases.
During the first, the ‘emergency’ period immediately
following the catastrophe, the built form (termed the
“capital stock”) is damaged or destroyed, and normal
urban activities cease or are substantially changed.
During the second ‘restoration’ phase, buildings,
streets and services are patched, the displaced popula-
tion returns, and functions are becoming restored. In
the first of two ‘reconstruction’ phases, which may
occur 50-100 weeks from the disaster, patched fabric
is being replaced, and activity is at pre-disaster levels.
In the final phase, major construction is occurring to
improve the physical layout and structures, while
activities are improved and developed over their pre-
catastrophe levels (Kates and Pijawka, 1977). 
The aftermath of war is much less well studied at
the scale of physical urban reconstruction (Nasr,
1997, being a rare example). Instead, the reconstruc-
tion discourse, both contemporary and in subsequent
scholarly study, tends to cover economic, social and
cultural issues amongst others. The Kates/Pijawka
model can be applied to post-war urban reconstruc-
tion, albeit with a much revised time-line since,
historically, the recovery process is lengthy for such
war damage (as Chandler and Fox, 1974, demon-
strate). This paper examines the experiences of
England during and immediately after the Second
World War to explore both process and product of
post-catastrophe replanning where plans were
detailed and large-scale; radical and ineffectual;
immediate and long-term.
The nature and extent of disaster
The damage to British cities was both uneven and, in
comparison to many on the European mainland,
relatively light (cf Hewitt, 1983; Table 1). In general
it can hardly be compared to the Allies’ ‘thousand
bomber raids’ on Germany, particularly where incen-
diaries caused firestorms (Hamburg, Dresden) nor to
the atomic strikes on Japan (Hewitt, 1983). Yet the
lessons of the English bombing response might
provide parallels for other, more limited, damage
situations including terrorist attack.
Many English industrial centres and some south-
ern ports suffered badly. The ‘blitzes’ of London,
Coventry and Plymouth are particularly well-known
and resulted in areas where the majority of buildings,
and much infrastructure, were destroyed or at least
badly damaged. Such places are as close as England
came to a tabula rasa clearance. Another series of
raids, the so-called “Baedeker raids”, deliberately
targeted the historic cities of Bath, Canterbury,
Exeter, Norwich and York (Rothnie, 1992). They
caused a certain amount of physical damage, particu-
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Table 1
The result of bombing in the UK
Civilian deaths: … … … … … … … … … …60,595
Civilian injuries:  … … … … … … … …c. 236,000
Persons made homeless:  … … … … …c. 500,000
Cities significantly damaged:  … … … … … … …45
Area destroyed:  … … … … … … … … …15 sq km
Proportion of built-up area: … … … … … … …3%
Source: extracted from secondary sources by Hewitt
(1983), includes some data for Wales and Northern Ireland.
 
larly to historic quarters of densely-built and often
timber-framed buildings; but their main effect was on
civilian morale. During 1944/45 further damage was
inflicted by the V1 and V2 weapons in south-east
England, but this was random, relatively limited and,
once more, mainly a morale issue.
Other towns, even some in major industrially-
productive areas such as the West Midlands, suffered
surprisingly little. Most of the damage recorded in
Wolverhampton, for example, was “slight damage”
or “no damage other than broken windows” at the
height of the air raids in 1940-42 (Wolverhampton
Borough Council, 1940-2). Many places suffered the
inconvenience of air raid alarms but virtually no
physical damage. It is still not easy to gather
meaningful comparative statistics for damage to all
types of urban land-use, but Table 2 indicates, for
some key towns, the extent of destruction to the
housing stock. Ward (1994, p. 82) suggests that, in
total, some 475,000 dwellings were destroyed.
The planning response
The planning response must be understood first in the
context of what had been happening in the immedi-
ate pre-war period (Stevenson, 1986). Key concerns
were for the control of urban outward expansion and
replacement of the significant amount of high-density
slum housing in inner urban areas. Of course the two
went hand-in-hand, as when Birmingham celebrated
construction of its 50,000th municipal house in 1939
at then-standard densities of around 12 per acre
(30/ha). Some individual municipalities were begin-
ning to produce significant plans for future develop-
ment, and others were being commissioned on a
much wider spatial basis. At an even wider scale, the
problem of over-development in south-east England
led to the setting-up of a Royal Commission in 1937,
and its report (the Barlow Report, 1940) spurred
wider considerations of town planning. It is suggested
that this report underpinned “a keen realisation of
the need for comprehensive and radical town
planning” early in the war (Hasegawa, 1999, p. 139).
At the national scale, however, planning was
unstructured and uncontrolled. There was no specific
relevant Ministry. Building regulations controlled the
details of development, but owed their origins to
concerns for public health (Ley, 2002), and therefore
much planning came under the remit of the Ministry
of Health. 
Central government had, however, begun consider-
ation of mechanisms for planning early in the war. A
Consultative Panel on Physical Reconstruction,
chaired by Lord Reith (Minister of Works and
Buildings from October 1940), was established. An
Interdepartmental Committee of Officials on
Reconstruction had surveyed four sample blitzed areas
by February 1941. Inter alia it reported that the local
authorities concerned should be allowed to exercise
more planning controls, and should prepare outline
plans as soon as possible (National Archives [NA]
HLG 71/1570). Reith’s Panel had virtually completed
a draft manual for local authorities on the technique of
redevelopment in central urban areas as early as
October 1941 (NA HLG 86/8). Although Reith was
working towards a Town and Country Planning
(Reconstruction) Bill, which had been discussed at the
Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction Problems, and
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Table 2
Extent of destruction of houses
London  … … … … … … … … … … … …47,314 
(in the 18 boroughs of the LCC area)
Merseyside  … … … … … … … … … … …10,542 
(Liverpool, Birkenhead, Bootle, Wallasey)
Birmingham  … … … … … … … … … … … 5,065
Portsmouth  … … … … … … … … … … … 4,393
Coventry  … … … … … … … … … … … … 4,185
Hull … … … … … … … … … … … … … … 4,184
Plymouth  … … … … … … … … … … … … 3,593
Bristol  … … … … … … … … … … … … … 2,909
Sheffield  … … … … … … … … … … … … 2,906
Manchester  … … … … … … … … … … … 1,951
Yarmouth  … … … … … … … … … … … … 1,636
Source: extracted from National Archives files by
Marmaras (1992).
 
the Government had agreed that the planning
functions of the Ministry of Health should be trans-
ferred to a dedicated Ministry, Reith was replaced in
February 1942 and his Consultative Panel ceased to
meet (Hasegawa, 1992, p. 8). The central impetus for
considering reconstruction issues seemed to diminish,
and it was not until 1943 that a new Ministry of
Works and Planning was set up. However, one civil
servant’s view of this move was that “the prime justifi-
cation for the existence of a Ministry of Planning
during the war is one of morale. Its success or failure
must be largely measured by whether it is making
people more hopeful of the future” (Hasegawa, 1992,
pp. 9-10, quoting NA HLG 71/1253).
The Town and Country Planning (Interim
Development) Act 1943 and Town and Country
Planning Act 1944 began to develop mechanisms for
large scale replanning, particularly in terms of the
state’s powers for acquiring or otherwise controlling
land; but these were interim, contentious and not
wholly satisfactory. It was not until the 1947 Town
and Country Planning Act that a comprehensive, new
planning system was set up. Amidst much contro-
versy, this Act ‘nationalised’ development rights, and
henceforth specific permission was required for all
but the most minor development. New-style ‘devel-
opment plans’ were required. Delays seem to have
been caused by personality clashes between senior
politicians, between politicians and civil servants, and
between civil servants; and the issue of reconstruction
per se had been lost amidst larger considerations of
the practical, political and financial difficulties of
designing and implementing the radical new planning
system introduced in 1947.
At the local level, however, many individual
municipalities responded to the actual or threatened
damage with some speed. They were led by the badly-
damaged Plymouth, Coventry and London, and by
the incitement of Lord Reith when he visited
Plymouth in July 1941 to “go ahead, planning boldly
and comprehensively, go on with good planning and
bank on getting financial help” (ie from central
government) (Watson and Abercrombie, 1943, p. vii).
This incitement, together with programmes broadcast
by the BBC and exhibitions and publications
produced by the Royal Institute of British Architects
and other organisations, led to planning being viewed
as a morale issue, as the civil servant quoted above
suggested. Reconstruction planning in particular took
on a symbolic role.
The nature and extent of the local replanning
The circumstances of war — but not necessarily of
extensive physical damage — were incentives to
large-scale replanning. But, in many cases, the oppor-
tunity was taken to address pre-war concerns: this
was hardly a ‘new paradigm’ of planning (cf
Larkham, 2002, pp. 403-6). The direction was clearly
stated by a 1943 textbook for schoolchildren: “when
we build again, we must not repeat our old mistakes
– but create a city of which our grandchildren will be
proud” (Cadbury Brothers, 1943, pp. 48-9).
Evidence of about 200 plans has been traced
(Larkham and Lilley, 2001). The little — and un-
damaged towns and cities followed the badly —
damaged in preparing plans, often with considerable
speed. Many plans were begun, and some were even
published during the war, even in full colour, despite
paper and ink rationing. The peak period for recon-
struction plan publication was 1945-6. 
It seems often to be felt that these reconstruction
plans were the result of high-profile professional
planners. Much of the published literature explores
only the plans authored by these people, and for the
major cities. These consultants were usually expen-
sive to employ and were in high demand. One
individual, Thomas Sharp (President of the Town
Planning Institute in 1945-6) produced at least 10
plans, mainly for major historic cities including
Oxford, Exeter, Durham and Salisbury. His charges
ranged from 1,000 guineas for the heavily-damaged
city of Exeter (1946) to 2,500 guineas for Oxford
(1948) (Sharp papers, University of Newcastle upon
Tyne). Most of Sharp’s reports were widely circu-
lated, well reviewed in the professional press, and
published for the public — in full colour — by the
Architectural Press. Even the small, and relatively
little-damaged, industrial Midlands borough of
Dudley engaged T. Alwyn Lloyd OBE (again a Past
President of the TPI, in 1933-4) to replan the
Borough at a cost of 450 guineas in 1944.
Yet at least half of the known plans were
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produced by professional officers employed by
individual municipalities, and there seems to be little
qualitative difference between the reconstruction
concepts employed by these officers and the expen-
sive consultants. Indeed, some municipal plans were
far more detailed than the brief pamphlets produced
by consultants such as Alwyn Lloyd for Dudley or
Dobson Chapman for Macclesfield. A few plans were
even produced by amenity groups, local newspapers
or even by private individuals. This was an unparal-
leled outpouring of plans, representing a tremendous
investment of time, effort and resources at a crucial
time in the course of the war and immediately after-
wards. Being produced in such a short space of time,
these plans together represent a virtual textbook of
contemporary planning and urban design ideas. This
was “a remarkable decade of innovation and
advance” in British planning (Cherry, 1988, p. 108).
Plan production soon declined, however, because the
new ‘development plans’ specified by the 1947 Act
were rather different in their function, structure and
preparation. They were more technocentric in their
reliance on substantial survey data collection, tabula-
tion and analysis, and they no longer illustrated the
planners’ images of future townscapes.
It has been suggested that the early reconstruction
plans were radical in their proposals. Official corre-
spondence suggests that, by about 1946,
An exemplary plan would envisage a reconstructed
town centre, encircled by ring roads ... the centre
was then divided by main roads into ‘precincts’,
each of which was given a specific function ...
emphasis was also placed on the creation of
spaciousness ... by ample provision of open spaces
and wide roads in general, and in particular, of a
central square, a civic centre and/or a shopping
centre (Hasegawa, 1999, p. 145, from reports in
NA HLG 71/597).
These were sweeping proposals, “unfettered by
the existing road and land use patterns” (Hasegawa,
1999, p. 144). This is the epitome of the tabula rasa
approach. Yet, despite producing such proposals, a
few local authorities and planners protested that they
were neither interested nor involved in working from
a tabula rasa. The City Engineer of the City of
London, for example, wrote that “the City is not, and
never can be, whatever the destruction by enemy
action of its buildings, in any sense regarded as a
virgin building estate” (Forty, 1942, p. xxv).
Such large-scale plans can be typified by that
drawn up for the industrial city of Newcastle upon
Tyne by Percy Parr OBE, its City Engineer and
Planning Officer, and published by the city in
October 1945 as a 131-page small-format booklet
priced at a reasonably-affordable two shillings and
sixpence (Parr, 1945). The historic, but relatively
unstructured, pre-war street pattern, with its
medieval core, Georgian rebuilding and Victorian
extensions (Figure 1) was to be transformed to a
much less-dense, highly-structured hierarchical
network, bounded by a dual-carriageway ring road
(Figure 2). The iconic, early plan for the badly-
bombed naval port of Plymouth, part authored by the
eminent consultant planner and academic Professor
Sir Patrick Abercrombie, proposed a completely
restructured town centre equally as radical as Parr’s
Newcastle (Watson and Abercrombie, 1943).
Abercrombie felt that the devastation would allow “a
plan which would embody drastic proposals”
(quoted in Chalkley and Goodridge, 1991, p. 66).
The plan proposed a rather beaux-arts-styled axial
road over 1,000 yards (914m) long, from railway
station to waterfront, orthogonal to a series of paral-
lel shopping streets, largely surrounded by a ring
road. Architectural style was to be uniform and of
high quality, with Regent Street as the inspiration.
Land uses were strictly zoned.
Roads were often the major structural feature,
reflecting concern over traffic densities and flows. It
was not uncommon for schemes to propose multi-
level highways, grade-separated interchanges, large-
scale roundabouts and ‘precinct’ subdivisions, and
other American-inspired ideas promoted by the
senior police officer H. Alker Tripp (1942). Even
‘third party’ proposals, ie not drawn up by planning
professionals, employed some of these concepts, as
when the Bristol Retail Traders’ Association
produced a retail proposal with complete pedes-
trian/vehicle segregation, two levels of ramped access
to stores, etc. These plans were described as “wildly
futuristic and unrealistic” (Punter, 1990, p. 31). This
fascination for what Diefendorf (1989) termed
“technocentric” replanning is clearly shown by the
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proposed new river crossing at Norwich: a large-scale
bridge carried on the roofs of a series of new
factory/warehouse structures (James, Pierce and
Rowley, 1945; Figure 3). 
A second common feature was land-use zoning,
which sought to resolve historic juxtapositions of
‘non-conforming’ land uses, a process made simpler
by the compulsory purchase and large-scale redevel-
opment of urban central areas. Although widely used,
this ‘precinct’ model “meant that much of the
mixture and diversity of central city land uses was
doomed” (Punter, 1990, p. 27, writing of Bristol).
Thirdly, many plans contained some explicit
reference to retaining old buildings; even if, as in
Coventry, they were moved to new sites. The
Plymouth plan even developed ideas of area-based
preservation (nearly a quarter-century before this
became embedded in planning law) (Larkham,
2003a). A related point, seen in the implemented
redevelopment but rarely in the plans themselves,
was the creation of memorials to the bomb disaster,
often in the form of retaining bomb-damaged
churches or other ‘special buildings’ (eg
Birmingham, Coventry, Exeter, Plymouth, York:
Nasr and Larkham, 2004). This memorialisation
seems to have become a public desire particularly
after the end of hostilities, rather than something
explicitly provided for in the plans.
8 Peter J. Larkham
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Figure 1
The street layout of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 
before the Second World War 
(adapted from Parr, 1945)
Figure 2
The street layout of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 
as proposed in the 1945 reconstruction plan 
(adapted from Parr, 1945)
 
Problems with implementation
Very few of these reconstruction plans were imple-
mented. The proposals for radical change met with
considerable inertia at best, and often outright
opposition. Of those recognisably implemented, the
built form differs – often quite substantially – from
the plan. As Hasegawa (1999) argued, for a broad
range of political, economic and practical reasons,
the first generation of plans were overtaken by much
less radical plans from the mid and late 1940s. Even
these were changed by the time of their implementa-
tion. Construction material was rationed until the
mid 1950s, and this imposed a significant practical
burden on reconstruction. Finding the finance for
these schemes, even if planned for phased implemen-
tation over several decades, proved extremely diffi-
cult.
In Plymouth, for example, a number of changes
were made to the plan in the course of implementa-
tion, often for reasons of economy (Chalkley, 1983,
Figures 2 and 3; Chalkley and Goodridge, 1991, 
p. 74). Political expediency in this heavily-damaged
area led to speedy implementation. Since completion
of this plan, changing retailing fashions and patterns,
increasing car ownership and other trends have
significantly affected this flagship reconstruction,
although there have been (muted) suggestions that its
importance in English planning should merit some
recognition or protection (Chalkley, 1998, 
pp. 207-211).
One major implementation problem is that,
historically, patterns of landownership in most city
centres have become fragmented. This hampered
large-scale reconstruction, as diverse landowners may
have had very different aspirations for their property,
particularly if it remained undamaged. This issue is
highlighted by the Town Clerk’s evidence to a public
inquiry on the Portsmouth reconstruction scheme: “It
was imperative … that redevelopment should be
undertaken as a whole, and the only way to accom-
plish this was by vesting the ownership of the land in
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Figure 3
The proposed roof-top viaduct across the River Wensum, Norwich, UK, 
reproduced from the plan by James et al. (1945).
the Council” (Estates Gazette, 1947). However,
traders were generally very reluctant to lose their
established freeholds, possibly in exchange for leased
sites in redeveloped areas, with unknown trading
potentials and uncertainty over the costs of leases.
Furthermore, compulsory purchase implied heavy
cost, with the burden of borrowing and subsequent
repayments to fall heavily on local taxation. The scale
of costs of these reconstruction plans was a perennial
complaint. Lewis Silkin (then the Minister of Town
Planning) commented in 1949 that 
I believe what the public is looking for to-day is the
translation of those attractively illustrated two-
guinea volumes into concrete or brick ... [many
planners] have prepared their beautiful documents
without bothering to ascertain what their plans are
going to cost to implement ... Sometimes they have
acted almost as if they expected that the plan would
never materialise at all (speech at the Annual Dinner
of the Town Planning Institute, reported in Estates
Gazette 1949a).
In Wolverhampton, for example, the detailed
proposals for a new Civic Centre exhibited in the
1945 plan and exhibition attracted substantial criti-
cism from members of the public, largely on its high
cost and irrelevance to public perceptions of the
urgent issues of reconstruction. As this reconstruction
envisaged the destruction of much undamaged urban
fabric, “where is the money coming from for this too
ambitious scheme – the destroying of whole blocks of
good buildings such as banks, business premises,
wholesale and retail markets ...” (letter in the
Wolverhampton Express and Star, 30 January 1945:
Larkham, 2002). In Bristol, the 1946 proposals
covered 771 acres (312 ha) and the cost of compul-
sory land purchase was put at £26 million, and
thought likely to double (Punter, 1990, p. 29).
A further technical implementation problem came
in the provisions for compensating landowners for
war damage. The pages of the Estates Gazette
throughout the 1940s show numerous examples and
court cases where owners sought higher compensa-
tion and, in Plymouth, and other badly bomb-
damaged areas, higher payments would be made if
the pre-war street and property pattern was adhered
to. Radical new street patterns, albeit involving
compulsory purchase, also involved significantly
lower damage compensation payments (as discussed
for Plymouth by Chalkley, 1983, p. 28).
No one can be blamed for this idealistic planning. It
was commenced during the time of the heavy
bombing, and planners living in the towns affected
were under the impression that their particular
town would suffer very heavy damage even if it
were not obliterated altogether. A planner can,
therefore, be forgiven if he “let himself go” a little
in his early designs. The financial side did not worry
him, for was not everyone talking about expendi-
tures of millions per day on the war? (Hough, 1944,
p. 10).
Lastly, speed of reconstruction was a major
demand, for reasons of both practicality and morale.
“Traders formerly occupying premises in the princi-
pal shopping area are ... insistent in their request that
they should be given facilities ... so that they can
resume business with the least possible delay, while
industrial undertakings expect the same considera-
tion and assistance” (Cook, 1943, p. 62, writing of
Southampton). The conflict had relatively little
medium- or long-term urban impact: some evacuees
returned, even to London, within weeks or months,
services were speedily repaired, and industrial
production was usually impaired for weeks at most.
But complying with the demand for speedy replan-
ning was not easy, for the reasons outlined above; the
quickly-produced, earlier, plans were the more
radical and difficult to implement.
Lessons and conclusions
The English post-war experience suggests some
important lessons. First, the relationship of planning
systems and structures at national, regional and local
levels is vital. England was only just beginning to
develop a national system, had no regional govern-
ment, and planning at the local level was then volun-
tary. Building control existed, but remained focused
on public health concerns. Personality clashes
between politicians and civil servants delayed the
development and implementation of more robust
systems, and there were also tensions between
10 Peter J. Larkham
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national and local government. Reconstruction had
to deal with fragmented landownership; diverse
aspirations of landowners, traders and the public;
changing standards of living and working; changing
materials and construction technology; and compet-
ing ideologies of existing and emerging professions
(particularly architecture and town planning respec-
tively). Such a weak system could hardly cope with
implementing so many large-scale plans. Catastrophe
will highlight the weakness of any system, including
that of planning itself.
In such a weak system, however, short-term
solutions, blinkered vision and subordination to
established interests will rule, as Bowden (1970, p.
25) found in a different reconstruction context: “In a
laissez-faire situation in a democratic system the
business community is unlikely to implement a
rebuilding plan that promises to hurt individual and
collective commercial interests”. This may, in part,
explain the inertia and the tendency observed by
Hasegawa (1999) for later plans to be far less radical
in nature.
Secondly, immediate bomb damage and a
concerted media campaign (organised for the most
part by architects) led to public demands for immedi-
ate reconstruction. It was difficult to manage the
production of suitable plans at speed; several of the
key consultants were rapidly booked up and had to
decline further commissions; and collecting what
increasingly became viewed as the necessary knowl-
edge-base for replanning took considerable time (cf
Lock’s ‘civic survey’ of Hull, 1943) especially where
bomb damage had destroyed local records (Watson
and Abercrombie, 1943, p. vii). But not all plans were
able to be produced so quickly. Some, such as York,
took five years or more. Delays in producing plans,
even for good reason, and particularly in publishing
them for the wider public to read, led quickly to
public disaffection.
Thirdly, the English example clearly shows that
undamaged cities produced wide-ranging reconstruc-
tion plans at least as swiftly as the badly-damaged
cities. Adopting the ‘fashion’ of reconstruction
planning, and employing its terminology and its key
concerns, was a result of numerous factors including,
at the civic level, competition and place promotion as
cities sought to re-position themselves in the post-war
urban hierarchy and economy (Larkham and Lilley,
2003). The concepts and solutions of reconstruction
planning thus became embedded in the mainstream
of British post-war planning and urbanism.
Fourthly, once produced, the plans varied between
templates for action (a ‘top-down’ approach, follow-
ing the then-dominant paradigm where the expert
planner’s task was to produce a masterplan of future
urban form and structure: cf Taylor, 1998) or consul-
tative documents put forward to promote public
participation. Several, such as that for Walsall, made
much of their requests for public “criticism” (Walsall
County Borough Council, 1943; Larkham, 2003b).
Both approaches, however, generated public antipa-
thy as, for example, to Wolverhampton’s detailed
proposals for a civic centre, where the public
complained both at the cost and at the inappropriate
prioritising of office development for municipal staff
instead of housing and city-centre development
(Larkham, 2002). At best, apathy resulted. It was
rare for consultations or exhibitions to attract more
than a tiny percentage of the city’s population. Exeter
was an exception: the Western Morning News
reported on 15 January 1946 that 20,438 people –
nearly one-third of the city’s population – had
attended the exhibition of Sharp’s proposals.
This leads to the fifth issue. The scale and nature
of proposals failed, in general terms, to catch public
attention. This appears as true for the earlier, more
radical schemes such as Coventry and Plymouth as
for the later, seemingly more conservative, proposals.
The professional praise usually found in contempo-
rary reviews was not generally mirrored by the
public, and a number of plans – such as that for
Walsall (Larkham, 2003b) – fell very quickly from
public gaze despite the cheapness and availability of
publications and the mounting of public exhibitions.
Sixthly, there were issues of access to the large-
scale funding necessary for these schemes – even
where proposals were spread over a significant time-
span. This, and the fact that building material was
rationed until the mid-1950s, led again to public and
political complaints that replanning was proceeding
far too slowly.
For a broad range of reasons, therefore, it is often
held that this period of unparalleled planning activity
was, in fact, a failure. As early as 1944, one critic
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suggested that an appropriate comment on this
period would be “Never has so much been said on
one subject, by so many, with so little effect” (Hough,
1944, p. 9). Few plans were implemented in anything
like their original form. Any implementation
proceeded slowly, and a public apathy developed.
Early radicalism quickly became diluted (Hasegawa,
1999). Planning “failed to dislodge the established
administrative systems or to overcome the temptation
to make do with ad hoc measures” (Stevenson, 1986,
p. 75). Even Plymouth moved, in the course of a
decade, from the idealism of “plan boldly” to “plan
modestly” and finally to “plan for essentials” (from a
reviewer of the city’s 1950s Development Plan, in
Tiratsoo, 2000, p. 30). In short, and as Popkin writes
of other post-disaster reconstructions, “despite the
best efforts to shape the character of the recon-
structed city, fundamental change is unlikely. Past
trends will be accelerated in most cases” (Popkin,
1977, p. xxxiii).
Nevertheless, these cities were resilient and did
recover. The immediate post-war circumstances
changed markedly during the boom years of the
1960s and 1970s, when urban redevelopment
occurred at tremendous scale and speed, using the
‘comprehensive clearance’ approach. Some, including
Prince Charles (1987), have suggested that more
damage was done at this time than by the wartime
bombing. A significant public, and then professional,
reaction against this scale of change (Aldous, 1975;
Esher, 1980) developed into a set of generally-
accepted planning and urban design principles
including “do not develop at too large a scale at one
time” (Tibbalds, 1988, p. 1). Nevertheless, many of
these reconstruction plans did have an effect: the
“persistence of the plan” affected actual and
proposed urban form, particularly in the case of
large-scale infrastructure such as ring roads, for
decades after the 1940s.
The English experience can readily be compared
to the general post-disaster model developed by Kates
and Pijawka (1977). First, in the ‘emergency’ period,
the damage to the built stock was much lighter than
in many other countries. Normal urban activities, as
many social histories suggest, actually continued in
the majority of places with relatively minor interrup-
tion. During the second ‘restoration’ period, services
and buildings were patched, and temporary struc-
tures erected in many of the worst-damaged areas.
But some temporary structures were still being built
in the late 1940s. On the other hand, some munici-
palities did not permit temporary structures because
they might adversely affect proposed redevelopments
(eg Southampton: Cook, 1943, and Bristol: Estates
Gazette, 1949b). Over fifty years after their construc-
tion, some temporary structures still remain and have
been protected for their architectural and historic
interest. Replanning to improve structures and condi-
tions occurs very early in many English cases, but
implementation was delayed owing to the ongoing
war, material rationing, and funding issues. Therefore
the final two stages in the Kates/Pijawka model are
confused and may be significantly delayed. The
replacement of patched and temporary structures
may not occur until realisable large-scale plans are
agreed: in some towns this was not until the 1960s.
Although influenced by the idealistic wartime recon-
struction plans, the implementation of even the 1960s
plans took decades. In central Birmingham a small
number of cleared sites still remain, and in Hull one
bombsite remains as a surface car-park. 
Planning for reconstruction following wartime
destruction is not, therefore, a clear-cut procedure,
and is certainly not necessarily speedy; irrespective of
whether the country concerned was the victor or loser
in the conflict (compare, for example, Nasr, 1997). In
the case discussed here the changing nature of
planning at the time, and the input from party
politics, and public consultation and criticism,
further complicated the issue (see, for example,
Tiratsoo, 2000). Yet the theories, philosophies and
techniques of town planning are constantly changing
(Taylor, 1998). The values and attitudes of profes-
sionals and public likewise change. Towns and cities
are constantly changing, albeit at different rates.
Perhaps we should conceive of post-disaster recon-
struction more as one element of a continuum of
urban process and procedure, rather than as a specific
and distinct issue.
Planning for reconstruction after the disaster of war 13
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